Is current event guidance and legislation sufficient?
As the event industry continues to grow, the likelihood for incidents and issues remains a persistent and present threat. High profile major incidents resulting in scrutiny and review have helped shaped the improvement and understanding of crowd management, however incidents continue to occur. The improved approach to planning, licensing and operationalising events is now governed by legislation and guidance. However, the somewhat vague instruction given to event organisers has resulted in a far from standardised approach and the knowledge, training and understanding which underpin some of the guidance should be questioned and challenged to ensure crowd safety is maintained.
A standard approach to solve an issue should see best practice and experience shared and combined to provide improved processes. Whilst the event industry is a complex ever evolving world, the current practices in planning, licensing and operationalising do little to standardise the approach. Griffiths (2015) confirms there is a safety issue in the event industry and improvement is required; as Tarlow also points out, ‘the growth of the leisure industry will increase risk, and the need to manage that risk is becoming an ever-greater challenge to the entire…industry’ (p. 5). Governance and legislation are piecemeal and somewhat reliant upon extensions of existing law such as The Licensing Act 2003 and Health and Safety legislation (1974). It is noticeable that Football is treated very differently to all other events, immediately challenging the notion of a standardised approach. Even though football does have specific legislation, it can be seen as reactionary, introduced after a major incident such as the Hillsborough disaster or significant issues such as at the European Championships in 2000.
Event organisers are provided with guidance, notably The Green Guide and The Purple Guide, which will be reviewed and found to be useful but insufficient. The employment of a Safety Officer and engagement with the Safety Advisory Group process are two of the key elements in event safety and both will be discussed. The collective views of emergency services, local authority and any other appropriate experts are sought in this forum with a view to safeguard proposed events and their management plans. However, the vague guidelines and lack of specific direction result in a very different approach across the country, meaning event organisers are faced with varying approaches rather than a standard process (Mawer, Stewart, Woodham, 2019). A suggested way to assist in standardisation is through the more widespread understanding and use of crowd modelling. A model provides a framework and therefore a consistent starting point in addressing an issue. The current application of modelling in event planning is limited, with little or no direction or guidance given to event organisers in their availability or use. With a wide range and variance in the type of model available, independent guidance from experts in the field as to their application would be beneficial. A standardised approach could see more widespread modelling providing greater structure, consistency and ultimately safety in event planning. The current practice allows for inexperienced, unskilled ‘Safety Officers’ to write management plans with no reference to planning tools, models or research, therefore, it is suggested a review into major event planning is necessary.
Current Guidance and Legislation
The event industry continues to develop and evolve with events taking place in more varied environments every year, such as village high streets, shopping centres, open spaces, central business districts and stadia (Abbot, Geddie 2001). Organisers are therefore faced with a wider range of risks some of which will be made more difficult by the complexity of the environment. It is imperative for guidance and legislation to keep pace with these changes and therefore assist in maximising safety. Organisers are currently bound most notably by Health and Safety Legislation, The Licensing Act 2003 and guidance documents such as ‘The Purple Guide’ and ‘The Green Guide’. Whilst other guidance is available through research, such as ‘Understanding Crowd Behaviours’, the two aforementioned guidelines are the most commonly used and often quoted in the event industry.
No specific legislation exists in relation to organising an event and instead more general areas of law are applied to ensure organisers have responsibilities. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 makes no mention of events but instead more generally makes employers legally responsible for the safety of all staff and customers using their services, therefore including the majority of organisers and all those present at their event (Mawer et al 2019). Legislation does not mandate how this is done and whilst it imposes a legal duty, there are no preventative, overt measures legislated, with breaches in the law often only apparent after an injury, incident or worse (Griffiths interview 2015).
The Licensing Act, 2003, provides legislation regarding the sale of alcohol and provision of regulated entertainment, amongst other things, and mandates requirement of a license granted by the local authority. An event organiser must satisfy the licensing authority against four key objectives: the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance and the protection of children from harm (The Licensing Act 2003, 2.4). Similarly, with the Health and Safety Act there is no definitive way detailed in which this should be done, and Licensing Authorities are trusted to make appropriate decisions with regards to the licenses they grant. Given the governing legislation is not specific and covers a much wider range of situations, environments and social entities, it is suggested it fails to effectively ensure robust safety management of major events. The vague overarching statements provided in both examples allow for varied interpretation and application and a failure to adhere to the legislation would only come to light with appropriate scrutiny or a significant incident resulting in injury or worse. Furthermore, by applying these wide ranging areas of legislation, there are loop holes such as an event being run by a volunteer, therefore stepping outside of Health and Safety legislation, and an event with no licensable activity avoiding the need to adhere to the Licensing Act. However, in the absence of legislative change, guidance is available to event organisers. Such documents are viewed as best practice and any non-compliance may need to be explained and accounted for at a subsequent hearing or court case (SGSA 2018, The Purple Guide, 2015).
The cheerfully named ‘Green’ and ‘Purple’ Guides are key publications in the event industry. The aforementioned was spawned in 1973 following Lord Wheatley’s report into the Ibrox Stadium disaster in 1971 (University of Glasgow, n.d). Updated editions followed disasters at Bradford’s Valley Parade stadium and Hillsborough in Sheffield as well as more recently adapting to include modern threats such as terrorism. The guide is now in its sixth edition and relates specifically to Sports Ground Safety and particularly football stadia (SGSA, 2018). The Purple Guide was first published as the Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events in 1993 and was updated to the Event Safety Guide in 1999 (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). It’s guises and authors (having changed from HSE to industry experts) gives an idea of the somewhat haphazard approach to event safety guidance over the past few decades.
Given these two distinct guides exist, in itself, highlights a lack of standardised guidance with some sporting events subject to differing guidance to other crowded events. Whilst both documents provide insight into their respective fields, they often apply a somewhat soft touch; nudging, suggesting and advising organisers to possibly think about certain things. An opening line from the Purple Guide declares ‘following this guidance is not compulsory’ and it ‘hopes to encourage a consistency’ whilst the Green Guide similarly states it ‘seeks to encourage the meeting of achievable standards’ (Purple Guide, 2015, SGSA, 2018 p. 25).
These two prominent documents in the events industry provide useful guidance in a range of relevant areas. They are recommended reading for event organisers, however in the absence of legislation they are considered lacking in certain safety related areas. Neither guide sufficiently explores crowd theory prompting the Cabinet Office to report ‘although much is already known about preparation for and management of crowd events, this knowledge has not been captured and articulated in a single guidance document’ (The Cabinet Office 2010, p. 20). This publication then goes on to provide detailed information, including reference to research and recommendations for these working in crowded environments. There remains a lack of clear direction with reference to ‘sufficient training’, advice such as ‘plan thoroughly for every event’ and ‘be aware of becoming complacent’ there remains a vagueness (p.22). That said, this document is again useful for crowd safety managers and all should have an awareness and understanding of the content. There is a lack of instruction or firm insistence given to event organisers, which, when coupled with the non-specific legislation discussed above, allows for a range of differing approaches to the planning and operating at major events (Cabinet Office 2010, Wijermans,, Conrado, van Steen, Martella, C., Li, J. 2016 and Tatrai, 2010). In summary, the foremost industry legislation and guidance states employers have a responsibility for the safety of all persons present at an event but does little to dictate a standard approach for ensuring this safety or mitigating risk
Current Practice – The Safety Officer
Two examples of how a lack of clarity manifest in further variance in event safety management are the employment of a Safety Officer and the engagement with a Safety Advisory Group. Again confirming the non-standard approach, the SGSA suggest in Chapter 3 of their guidance, the requirement for a Safety Officer to be appointed, that he or she should be in overall control of safety on event day and that this person should have the appropriate skills and experience to fulfil the role (p. 43). It then goes on to list potential qualifications to demonstrate competency, with Level 4 NVQ in safety management as the recommended minimum requirement. This guidance does therefore, set a standard and, by specifically referring to a qualification, reduces ambiguity and allows for simple scrutiny. The content, assessment and awarding of the mentioned qualification provides another discussion point, however in the context of this report, it does indeed set a standard.
The Purple Guide does not follow suit and instead repeatedly refers to a ‘competent’ person when discussing safety management and risk assessment. Interestingly, unlike the Green Guide, there is no mention of training and instead the advice states, ‘the appointed person should have relevant knowledge and experience to identify crowd specific hazards’ (Purple Guide, 13.1) There is no requirement for a trained, experienced Safety Officer to be employed by an event organiser but instead a competent person with ‘relevant knowledge’ (The Purple Guide, 13.1). With limited research a wide range of crowd related ‘qualifications’ can be found with one such course charging twenty pound, lasting forty-five minutes and claiming to provide ‘a comprehensive guide to event health and safety, by highlighting serious risks, ensuring a safe venue and successful crowd control.’ (New Skills Academy, n.d). In the absence of a national minimum standard, this is an example of how production of a certificate from this course may imply the individual has received adequate training and may lead to employment as a Safety Officer.
The Health and Safety Executive also provides advice and again advises a ‘competent person’ should be appointed to manage health and safety concerns adding that this could be the event organiser themselves (HSE, n.d). This clearly allows for a situation whereby the appointed competent person has in fact received little or no training in some or any of the complex areas of crowd management and risk analysis. The HSE advice in fact confirms this stating ‘it’s not…essential for them to have formal qualifications and they’re not required by law to have formal training’ (HSE, n.d).
The ambiguity of this guidance and the lack of a minimum standard allows for varied interpretation and the author sees two main issues with this approach. Firstly, who assesses this level of competency – are they competent themselves to do so? And secondly, when does it become apparent that a person was in fact incompetent? If the first question raised is not appropriately addressed, then it is likely the answer to the second question will involve a serious incident. Mawer et al argue that ‘near misses in crowd situations, and at public events, do occur but go unreported, meaning that opportunities for improvement pass unnoticed’ and as such, potential incompetence is masked. (2015, p. 12). Graham Mackrell, the Safety Officer at Hillsborough, was only discovered to be incompetent after three years in his role when on 15th April, 1989, 96 people died in a major overcrowding incident during an FA Cup Semi Final (BBC, 2019). And only after the incident was it reported he had received no training in crowd safety or management. (BBC, 2019). Whilst The Green Guide has to some extent addressed this in relation to certain sporting events with the setting of a minimum qualification requirement, surely this incident is relevant to the entire industry and therefore should be widely reflected in legislation or at least guidance (Harris 1999).
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Current Practice – The Safety Advisory Group
The inception and now widespread use of Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) could be seen as the mechanism by which the competence of a Safety Officer is assessed and management plans are scrutinised to a standard level. As Bev Griffiths from the Emergency Planning College points out, it is ‘vital event organisers and those involved in staging events to work closely in partnership with local authorities and the emergency services.’ (Stand Out Magazine, 2015). The role of the SAG is to ‘provide a forum for discussing and advising on public safety at an event’ and gives emergency services, local authorities and other relevant experts an opportunity to review safety provision (HSE, n.d). As with many changes in the event industry, SAGs were encouraged after Lord Justice Taylor’s report into the Hillsborough disaster in 1989, recommended improved communication between the emergency services and a more joined up approach in assessing safety at sporting fixtures (Home Office, 1989). The adoption of this process throughout the event industry is certainly a positive step, and with improved guidance could become a more effective tool in monitoring event safety.
However, with no definitive rules in how the process should function, there is a lack of consistency across the country in how SAGs operate which has caused friction in the industry (Mawer et al 2015, Griffiths 2015). Whilst attempts have been made in the past to standardise functionality, these have been met with limited success as local authorities continue to adopt their own processes. (Mawer et al, 2015). The Emergency Planning College did publish a guidance document for Safety Advisory Groups in 2015 which was updated in 2019, but, from experience, this document is not widely known in the industry or regularly referred to (PC Jones 2020, PC Darbyshire 2020). In fact, rather than solving certain issues, the document goes on to highlight the existence (and implied acceptance) of local variations, the difficulty in assessing the word ‘competent’, and the lack of clarity around which events even require SAG involvement (Mawer et al 2015). Again, the ‘guidance’ fails to provide specific structure and national policy to enable standardisation, so much so, that organisers are not mandated to engage with the SAG in the first place. (Griffiths, 2015)
The Safety Advisory Group has no legal responsibilities and neither do they have powers to allow or prevent events from taking place; meaning any major safety concerns need to be addressed using existing legislation (HSE, n.d). Therefore, the process relies on the SAG members being experts in their field, having a sound understanding of complex legislation, sufficient training and understanding of crowd behaviours and the authority and confidence to challenge event organisers. Herein lies the potential to exacerbate the issues raised in relation to the ambiguity in key legislation and guidance. In order for the SAG to work effectively and be able to plug any gaps, the members must have the required skill and knowledge base. Unfortunately, as Police Constable A points out ‘once you begin working in the Operation Department you start attending SAGs and you learn as you go. I attended many before I had any sought of training’ (2020). All guidance on SAGs agrees that members should, ‘have the appropriate skills, experience and position in their organisation to be credible and competent’ (Mawer et al 2015 p. 14, SGSA, 2018, HSE, n.d, Stockton Council, n.d). Similar wording as used in the appointment of a ‘safety officer’ and the writing of risk assessments and therefore posing the similar questions – how is the SAG members’ competence assessed?
The Safety Advisory Group has no legal responsibilities and neither do they have powers to allow or prevent events from taking place; meaning any major safety concerns need to be addressed using existing legislation (HSE, n.d). Therefore, the process relies on the SAG members being experts in their field, having a sound understanding of complex legislation, sufficient training and understanding of crowd behaviours and the authority and confidence to challenge event organisers. .
Herein lies the potential to exacerbate the issues raised in relation to the ambiguity in key legislation and guidance. In order for the SAG to work effectively and be able to plug any gaps, the members must have the required skill and knowledge base. Unfortunately, as Police Constable Darbyshire points out ‘once you begin working in the Operation Department you start attending SAGs and you learn as you go. I attended many before I had any sought of training’ (2020). All guidance on SAGs agrees that members should, ‘have the appropriate skills, experience and position in their organisation to be credible and competent’ (Mawer et al 2015 p. 14, SGSA, 2018, HSE, n.d, Stockton Council, n.d). Similar wording as used in the appointment of a ‘safety officer’ and the writing of risk assessments and therefore posing the similar questions – how is the SAG members’ competence assessed?
If, as the director of the Emergency Planning College, Bev Griffiths states, the SAG is to be seen as a vital part of the safety process it is once again important to establish a minimum requirement for its members through appropriate training and qualification (Stand Out Magazine, 2015). Simply being employed by the emergency services does not in itself qualify an individual to assess management plans and understand crowd behaviour or site dynamics. Crowd safety management is a complex field with potentially serious consequences; therefore, governance of this checking process should be standardised and tightened.
Conclusion
The event industry ranges
from the largest of festivals attracting hundreds of thousands of people down
to village fetes with maybe only tens of visitors attending and so implementing
a standard process for organisers to follow is of course not straight forward. However, it is argued the current process
fails to maximise safety at events and therefore change should be considered. Still (2014) explains ‘crowd injuries…can be
avoided through the application of foresight, planning and simple risk
analysis techniques’ (p. 2.) Insistence of a Safety Officer and minimum qualifications
for the post must surely be implemented at major events to ensure adequate
foresight and planning is practiced. The
determination of what constitutes a major event and at what level standardised
processes would be required would require further discussion, but this should
not be a reason to blindly accept the current system. One current concern is a significant event
taking place with an untrained ‘Safety Officer’ whose plans are assessed by a
group of emergency service and agency personnel who have little knowledge or
understanding of crowd theory. The
current legislation and guidance isolates football and provides more governance
for a lower league fixture than for a major summer festival. This is seen as a reaction to major incidents
and disasters within football, but why should this be the case? It should not take a significant incident at
a major event to influence legislation and guidance. Whilst many organisers
will have their own minimum standards and this is commended, the industry
should safeguard all events by insisting this is the case. The Cabinet Office saw this as a ‘real need’
in 2010 and highlighted the need for ‘enhanced consistency’ (p. 20). As early as 2001 Tatrai argued
‘I see no reason why ‘crowd safety requirements’
should not be globally standardized and believe that the early adoption of a
global risk management standard is the first step in ensuring minimisation of
crowd safety risk.’ (p. 9)
This standpoint
is echoed once more, and it is suggested experts are consulted to assist in the
standardisation and setting of minimum requirements to maximise crowd safety
and minimise risk at major events.
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